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Why doesn’t capital flow into fast-growing countries? In this paper, we provide a quantitative framework
incorporating heterogeneous producers and underdeveloped domestic financial markets to study the
joint dynamics of total factor productivity (TFP) and capital flows. When an unexpected once-and-for-all
reform eliminates non-financial distortions and liberalizes capital flows, the TFP of our model economy
rises gradually and capital flows out of it. The rise in TFP reflects efficient reallocation of capital and
talent, a process drawn out by frictions in domestic financial markets. The concurrent capital outflows
are driven by the positive response of domestic saving to higher returns, and by the sluggish response
of domestic investment to the higher TFP—the latter being another ramification of domestic financial
frictions. We use our model to analyze the welfare consequences of opening up capital accounts. We
find that the marginal welfare effect of capital account liberalization is negative for workers and positive
for entrepreneurs and wealthy individuals.
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yshin@wustl.eduThe standard economic theory suggests that capital should ﬂow from rich to poor countries,
unless the poor countries have lower overall productivity (Lucas, 1990) or a higher relative cost of
investment (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). Another prediction of the standard theory, arguably less
controversial, is that capital should ﬂow into countries experiencing a sustained increase in total
factor productivity (TFP). The evidence from developing countries over the last three decades
contradicts this prediction. If anything, capital tends to ﬂow out of countries with fast-growing
productivity, and into those with poorer performance (Prasad et al., 2007; Gourinchas and Jeanne,
2007).
From the time-series data of capital ﬂows and TFP, we observe that many episodes of sustained
TFP growth follow large-scale reforms and economic liberalizations. The periods of increasing net
foreign asset positions (capital outﬂows) coincide with such episodes. A successful explanation
of these phenomena requires both a theory of TFP dynamics and a model of international factor
reallocation. This is the goal of our paper.
We develop a quantitative framework where economy-wide growth-enhancing reforms and lib-
eralizations lead to a sustained period of productivity growth and capital outﬂows. We then use
the model to evaluate the welfare consequences of capital account liberalization.
We study the transitional dynamics of open economies with heterogeneous producers and im-
perfect domestic ﬁnancial markets. In our model, a reform initiates reallocation of resources from
previously-subsidized producers to productive entrepreneurs who have not been subsidized before
and are hence relatively poor. Such reallocation drives up aggregate TFP. The reallocation is grad-
ual because of the frictions in the domestic ﬁnancial market. In the early stages of the post-reform
transition, the problem for this economy is misallocation of capital, not under-accumulation. With
demand for capital restricted by the poorly-functioning domestic ﬁnancial market, the surplus
capital goes overseas in search of a higher return.
Heterogeneous production units and imperfect ﬁnancial markets are important elements of
endogenous TFP dynamics (Buera and Shin, 2008). We model ﬁnancial frictions in the form of col-
lateral constraints founded on imperfect enforceability of contracts. We consider economies where,
in addition to ﬁnancial frictions, individual entrepreneurs are subject to idiosyncratic distortions,
e.g., idiosyncratic taxes/subsidies, and sector-speciﬁc or size-dependent policies/regulations. Such
distortions help explain resource misallocation and resulting low aggregate productivity levels in
less developed economies (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Lagos, 2006; Restuccia and Rogerson,
2008; Guner et al., 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2007).
There are three kinds of reforms that we consider for our model economies: (i) a reform that
addresses idiosyncratic distortions; (ii) trade and capital account liberalization; (iii) a reform of
domestic ﬁnancial institutions.
In our main exercises, we consider two diﬀerent sequencing of reforms. These exercises start
with the same initial condition. We construct this initial condition by computing a stationary
equilibrium of an economy that (i) has idiosyncratic distortions, (ii) is closed to goods and capital
ﬂows, and (iii) has poorly-functioning domestic ﬁnancial markets.
1In our ﬁrst exercise, starting from this initial condition, we implement a reform that eliminates
the idiosyncratic non-ﬁnancial distortions that interfere with eﬃcient allocation of factors across en-
trepreneurs. At the same time, we liberalize the goods and capital ﬂows in and out of this economy.
We assume that domestic ﬁnancial frictions remain as before. We think of ﬁnancial frictions as
arising from imperfect enforceability of contracts, which is a component of broader institutions and
hence more sluggish. This sequencing of reforms—removing idiosyncratic distortions and opening
up to international capital markets, while not reforming the domestic ﬁnancial institutions—reﬂects
the actual experiences during the 1980s of Chile, India, Israel, Korea, Mauritius, and Taiwan. For
these countries, domestic ﬁnancial markets remained relatively underdeveloped until the late 1990s.
In our model, the elimination of idiosyncratic distortions leads to a sustained growth in produc-
tivity. TFP rises because the removal of idiosyncratic distortions leads to eﬃcient reallocation of
resources. The rise is gradual and persistent because the underdeveloped domestic ﬁnancial markets
can reallocate capital only slowly over time. Productive-but-poor individuals have to work for wage
for a while before they can save up enough collateral and enter into entrepreneurship. In addition,
even after they start their business, it takes time for them to overcome the credit constraints and
operate at the maximal-proﬁt scale.
More important, capital ﬂows out of this economy immediately following the reform. Intuitively,
in a closed economy with ﬁnancial frictions, the equilibrium interest rate is lower than in an
economy with well-functioning ﬁnancial markets: Credit frictions restrict the demand for capital
by constrained entrepreneurs, and they also induce constrained entrepreneurs to accumulate more
assets for self-ﬁnancing purposes (more supply of capital). When capital ﬂows are liberalized and
this small, now-open economy takes as given the world interest rate, there is an excess supply of
capital at the new and higher rental rate of capital. The surplus capital gets employed overseas.
Capital ﬂows mirror the diﬀerence between saving by domestic residents and domestic invest-
ment. Along the transition, domestic residents increase their saving in response to the higher
interest rate, eventually arriving at a stationary equilibrium with larger average asset holdings.
The removal of idiosyncratic distortions also aﬀects entrepreneurs’ investment and saving deci-
sions. Following the reform, the demand for capital from domestic production units falls further,
as the previously-subsidized entrepreneurs either exit or curtail their production, while the now-
productive individuals cannot enter and operate at an eﬃcient scale promptly because of the col-
lateral constraints. As the productive entrepreneurs enter and increase their scales of operation
over time, domestic demand for capital goes up. However, this increased demand is partly oﬀset by
accumulation of assets (supply of capital) by these entrepreneurs for self-ﬁnancing purposes, and
capital does not ﬂow back into this economy. In summary, the central economic force behind the
capital outﬂows in this exercise is the increase in domestic residents’ saving which outstrips the
changes in domestic investment.
In our second exercise, we reform the domestic ﬁnancial institutions as a part of a broader
reform package that also eliminates idiosyncratic distortions and liberalizes capital accounts. This
is a reasonable description of an economy that implements an across-the-board reform. The drastic
2reforms of Estonia in the early 1990s are an representative example.
In this exercise, TFP increases for two reasons: the removal of idiosyncratic distortions, and the
improved ﬁnancial markets. Unlike in the ﬁrst exercise, as we eliminate idiosyncratic distortions and
open up the economy, capital ﬂows into this economy. This outcome arises because the domestic
ﬁnancial market in this reformed economy functions better than that in the ﬁrst exercise: The
reallocation of capital among heterogeneous producers is expedited, and productive individuals can
enter entrepreneurship and expand their operation more quickly. As a result, the TFP grows much
faster than in the ﬁrst exercise. More to the point, domestic capital demand rises immediately after
the reform, and capital ﬂows in from overseas to meet this excess demand.
It is informative to compare the second exercise with one using the standard neoclassical growth
model. In our setup, an economy with perfect domestic credit markets is isomorphic to the neo-
classical growth model. If the productivity of the aggregate production function is raised in the
neoclassical model, capital will ﬂow into this small open economy and equalize the return to capital
with the world level instantaneously. Although our domestic ﬁnancial market reform does not take
our economy all the way to the perfect-credit benchmark, we obtain results that are qualitatively
similar.
In both exercises, the reforms simultaneously implemented the removal of idiosyncratic distor-
tions and the opening up of capital accounts. To understand why we model the reforms this way,
consider the following. One possibility is for the country to open up the capital account without
removing idiosyncratic distortions. As is discussed above, capital will still ﬂow out of this country,
because at the new, higher interest rate there is excess supply of capital in the domestic rental
market. However, TFP will remain largely unchanged, and we will not be able to address the
observed co-movements of TFP and capital ﬂows. Another possibility is to implement a reform to
eliminate idiosyncratic distortions while remaining a closed economy. The TFP will increase over
time as resources are reallocated, but by assumption we will not observe any capital ﬂows. As our
goal is to study the joint dynamics of TFP and capital ﬂows, we need to consider an exercise where
we eliminate idiosyncratic distortions and open up the economy.
Given the diﬀerent results we obtain in the ﬁrst and the second exercises, it is natural to ask
which sequencing of reforms is a more accurate description of emerging economies’ experiences.
There is ample documentation showing the prevalence of the sequencing in our ﬁrst experiment:
Reduction of sector-speciﬁc or size-dependent taxes and subsidies, along with capital account lib-
eralizations, preceded reforms of domestic ﬁnancial institutions in the countries that are relevant
for our analysis. In fact, the ﬁrst two are often referred to as “ﬁrst-generation” reforms, while
domestic ﬁnancial institutions belong to the domain of “second-generation” reforms (Camdessus,
1999). After all, the reform of domestic ﬁnancial institutions in emerging economies surfaced onto
the center stage of international policy debate only after the East Asian and Russian ﬁnancial crises
of the late 1990s (Mishkin, 2003; Stulz, 2005; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2008).
Our model lends itself well to a quantitative welfare analysis. Of particular interest is the welfare
consequence of capital account liberalization. Given that economists agree on the desirability of
3removing idiosyncratic distortions, we ask whether it is better to open up to international capital
ﬂows at the same time or not. Comparing the results of our ﬁrst exercise (removal of idiosyncratic
distortions while opening up) and the other case where these distortions are eliminated while the
economy remains closed, we ﬁnd that not all individuals beneﬁt from concurrent capital account
liberalization. Obviously, the wealthy directly beneﬁt from capital account liberalization, which
instantaneously gives them higher returns—the world interest rate—on their ﬁnancial assets. High-
ability individuals, who will choose to be entrepreneurs and tend to become wealthy, are better oﬀ
when the economy opens up. On the other hand, low-ability individuals, who will choose to be
workers, are better oﬀ when the economy remains closed, unless they start out very wealthy. With
capital account liberalization, capital ﬂows out of the country following the reform. Holding other
things equal, this implies less capital per worker for domestic production, and the wage is lower
than in the closed-economy transition, albeit temporarily. Wage eventually rises to a higher level
with capital account liberalization, but the lower wage along the transition prevails on the overall
welfare of low-ability individuals.
We draw the following conclusions from our exercises. To assess the eﬀects of the liberalizations
of cross-border capital ﬂows, it is important to ﬁrst understand their interaction with various
distortions that interfere with the allocation of production factors within an economy. It is also
important to understand the scope and sequencing of reforms that will be undertaken with the
capital account liberalization. The rest of this paper is an attempt at a quantitative exploration of
this mechanism.
Related Literature The earlier literature on capital ﬂows into developing countries focused on
the Lucas puzzle—the small size of capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries. Gertler and Rogoﬀ
(1990) and Boyd and Smith (1997) developed theories demonstrating how frictions in domestic
capital markets can interact with international capital markets and cause capital to ﬂow from poor
to rich countries. Matsuyama (2005) is a more recent example in this context. Caballero et al.
(2008) and Mendoza et al. (2009) emphasize this interaction between domestic and international
ﬁnancial markets to explain “global imbalances,” using models where the primary function of
ﬁnancial markets is to facilitate consumption smoothing. Castro et al. (2004) also analyze how
domestic ﬁnancial market imperfections can inﬂuence the direction of international capital ﬂows.
More recently, it has been documented that capital tends to ﬂow out of fast-growing (in terms
of output) countries, and into those with below-average growth (Prasad et al., 2007). Carroll et al.
(2000) use habit formation in preferences to explain this phenomenon in an endowment-economy
setup. On the other hand, Sandri (2009) and Song et al. (2009) use production-economy models
to explain the best-known example of a country that has grown fast and amassed a huge amount
of foreign assets during the past decade and a half: China. Sandri (2009) focuses on the market
incompleteness in sharing entrepreneurial risk, and in this sense is closely related to the underlying
mechanism of Caballero et al. (2008) and Mendoza et al. (2009). Song et al. (2009) capture the
interaction between the private sector and the state-owned ﬁrms with privileged access to ﬁnancing,
4a salient feature of the Chinese economy.
What sets our paper apart from the rest is our emphasis on endogenizing the joint dynamics of
capital ﬂows and TFP growth to directly address the “allocation puzzle” documented by Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2007): Among developing countries, those countries whose productivity increased
relative to the rest of the world exported capital.1 Another distinction of our paper is that we
build a quantitatively-oriented model, so that we can quantify the eﬀect of underlying mechanisms.
Also, unlike many earlier models that use a two-period overlapping-generation structure, ours has
an yearly frequency, which is important given the window of about ten years that we are interested
in.2
Our work also relates to the recent papers by Aoki et al. (2007, 2009), who study theoretically
how the adjustment to liberalization of international ﬁnancial transactions depends upon the degree
of domestic ﬁnancial development. We develop a quantitatively-oriented model to study the joint
dynamics of capital ﬂows and TFP growth following a broader set of reforms.3 In our framework,
the liberalization of capital ﬂows unaccompanied by other reforms only generates inconsequential
TFP dynamics. In order to account for the joint dynamics of capital ﬂows and TFP growth, one
needs to consider the broader set of reforms implemented in many developing economies.
1 Empirical Motivation: Allocation Puzzle
In this section we review the evidence on capital ﬂows and productivity growth. First, we reproduce
the ﬁndings of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) for the 1980–1995 period: Countries that exhibit large
TFP growth tend to increase their net foreign asset position. We then explore in more detail the
time series of TFP and net foreign asset positions for six countries that implemented large-scale
economic reforms and liberalizations in this period: Chile, India, Israel, Korea, Mauritius, and
Taiwan. As we show below, the large-scale economic reforms in these countries led to sustained
TFP growth accompanied by net accumulation of foreign assets.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the changes in net foreign asset positions and
productivity growth. TFP growth is deﬁned as per-capita income growth net of the contribution of
physical and human capital.4 As is clear from the ﬁgure, there is a signiﬁcant positive relationship
between the net accumulation of foreign assets (capital outﬂows) and TFP growth. On average,
one percentage point increase in TFP growth rate translates into 0.3 percentage point increase
in the net foreign asset to GDP ratio. Net foreign assets are measured in US dollars. We use
1Our main mechanism—domestic ﬁnancial frictions distorting allocation of capital both within and across
countries—is a recurring theme in the literature, and in particular it is one of the potential resolutions of the
allocation puzzle conjectured by Gourinchas and Jeanne themselves.
2With respect to Sandri (2009) and Song et al. (2009) in particular, our paper complements their work as we look
at a wider set of countries and also a diﬀerent time period, 1980–95. Notably, China is not one of the “allocation
puzzle” countries during this period. In Section 1, we discuss this issue in more detail.
3Compared to Aoki et al. (2007, 2009), our model has richer heterogeneity across entrepreneurs, an extensive
margin allowing unproductive entrepreneurs to become workers, and decreasing-returns-to-scale technologies at the
level of production units.
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Fig. 1: Allocation Puzzle. The horizontal axis measures the average TFP growth rates over 1980–1995.
The vertical axis measures the average rate of change in net foreign asset positions as a fraction of PPP
GDP over the same period. Negative (positive) numbers imply capital inﬂows (outﬂows). The net foreign
asset position data are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
international prices to construct the GDP series.5 Another thing to note is that we aggregate
the net foreign asset position of a country’s public and private sectors. With capital control,
most foreign asset transactions are channeled through government agencies, and hence the public
vs. private distinction is misleading. For the six countries we discuss below, we consulted their
government ﬁscal balance data and concluded that the movements in national saving are not largely
driven by public saving.6
We focus on the 1980–1995 period for three reasons. Firstly, the 1980s witnessed the ﬁrst wave
of capital account liberalizations in emerging economies. Secondly, during the 1990s, innovations in
international ﬁnancial markets (e.g. derivatives and oﬀ-balance sheet transactions) made it harder
to closely keep track of cross-border capital ﬂows, substantially amplifying measurement problems
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). Lastly, many emerging economies adopted an explicit policy of
improving their net foreign asset positions in the aftermath of the East Asian and Russian ﬁnancial
crises of the late 1990s. We focus on the relationship between productivity and capital ﬂows, and
our framework is not designed for an analysis of crises or such post-crisis behavior.
We take a closer look at the countries in the northeast quadrant (productivity growth and
capital outﬂows), and explore the time-series of their TFP and net foreign asset positions. For six
of these countries, we can identify and date large-scale economic reforms that coincide with the
onset of TFP growth. They are: Chile, India, Israel, Korea, Mauritius, and Taiwan. We do not
5If one were to use domestic prices to construct the GDP series, the ratio of net foreign asset positions to GDP
becomes much more volatile, owing to the ﬂuctuations in the nominal exchange rates. In addition, the slope coeﬃcient
becomes 1.02, worsening the allocation puzzle.
6The ﬁscal balance data are from tables in Bosworth et al. (1994), Leipziger (1997), Dommen and Dommen (1999),
Dabee and Greenaway (2001), Ben-Bassat (2002), and Kochhar et al. (2006).
6consider Hong Kong and Singapore for two reasons. Firstly, unlike the six countries above, we
could not clearly date a large-scale reform episode for Hong Kong or Singapore. More important,
Hong Kong and Singapore were developing into oﬀ-shore banking centers during this period, and
hence interpreting their net foreign asset positions is problematic. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007) for more on this issue. Also note that our sample period precedes the massive acquisition























































































Fig. 2: TFP and Net Foreign Asset Position. Year 0 on the horizontal axis (unit in years) is the year of
reform implementation, which is shown in parentheses next to the country name. Net foreign asset position
as a fraction of PPP GDP is measured on the left scale, and aggregate TFP can be read oﬀ the right scale.
TFP is normalized by its value in year 0.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of net foreign asset positions (dashed lines) and productivity (solid
lines) before and after major economic reforms. The year of the reform is set to zero, and the two
variables are plotted for the surrounding 20 years. Net foreign asset positions are measured relative
to PPP GDP (left scale), and TFP is relative to the year zero level (right scale). The dates of the
reforms are 1981 for Mauritius, 1982 for Korea and Taiwan, 1985 for Chile and Israel, and 1991 for
India. See the appendix for a description of these reform episodes. In all six cases, these large-scale
reforms ushered in a period of sustained productivity growth. At the same time, capital ﬂowed
out of these countries. Figure 2 shows that the relationship in Figure 1 is not a result of time
aggregation.
2 Model
The above empirical observations call for a model of TFP dynamics and capital ﬂows. We propose
a model with individual-speciﬁc technologies and imperfect credit markets.
7In each period, individuals choose either to operate an individual-speciﬁc technology—i.e. to
become entrepreneurs, or to work for a wage. This entrepreneur-worker occupation choice allows
for endogenous entry and exit in and out of the production sector, which are an important channel
of resource allocation. Imperfection in credit markets is modeled with a collateral constraint on
capital rental that is proportional to an individual’s ﬁnancial wealth.
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their entrepreneurial ability and wealth. Our
model generates endogenous dynamics for the joint distribution of ability and wealth. This ability-
wealth dynamics will turn out to be crucial for understanding macroeconomic transitions. In
addition, heterogeneity in entrepreneurial ability is essential in modeling how resource misallocation
leads to lower output and TFP.
We consider both an economy that is closed to capital ﬂows and a small open economy facing
a constant world interest rate. However, in this section, we do not consider idiosyncratic (non-
ﬁnancial) distortions such as idiosyncratic taxes/subsidies and size-dependent policies. We show
how to introduce idiosyncratic distortions into our model in Section 3.1.2.
Heterogeneity and Demographics Individuals live indeﬁnitely, and are heterogeneous with
respect to their wealth a and their entrepreneurial ability e ∈ E, with the former being chosen
endogenously by forward-looking saving decisions. An individual’s ability follows a stochastic
process. In particular, individuals retain their ability from one period to the next with probability ψ.
With probability 1−ψ, an individual loses the current ability and has to draw a new entrepreneurial
ability. The new draw is from an time-invariant ability distribution, and is independent of one’s
previous ability level. One can think of the ability shock as an arrival of a new technology making
previous production processes obsolete or less proﬁtable. In Section 3.1.1 we will calibrate this
shock to be of a relatively low frequency (an average duration of ten years), to match the frequency
of establishment turnovers in the US data.
We denote by µ(e) the measure of type-e individuals in the invariant distribution. We denote
by Gt(e,a) the cumulative density function for the joint distribution of ability and wealth at the
beginning of period t. Naturally, Gt(a|e) is the associated c.d.f. of wealth for a given ability type
e. The population size of the economy is normalized to one, and there is no population growth.
Preferences Individuals discount their future utility using the same discount factor β. The
preferences over contingent plans for the consumption sequence from the point of view of an





Technologies In any given period, individuals can choose either to work for a wage or to operate
an individual-speciﬁc technology. We label the latter option as entrepreneurship. We assume that
an entrepreneur with talent e who uses k units of capital and hires l units of labor produces according
8to a production function f (e,k,l), which is assumed to be strictly increasing in all arguments, and
strictly concave in capital and labor, with f (0,k,l) = 0 and lime→∞ f (e,k,l) = ∞.
Financial Markets Productive capital is the only asset in the economy. There is a perfectly-
competitive ﬁnancial intermediary that receives deposits, and rents out capital to entrepreneurs.
The return on deposited assets—i.e. the interest rate in the economy—is rt. The zero-proﬁt
condition of the intermediary implies that the rental cost of capital is rt + δ, where δ is the
depreciation rate. If the economy is open to capital ﬂows, its interest rate will be equal to the
constant world interest rate r∗: The intermediary can accept deposits from foreigners as well as
domestic residents at the interest rate r∗, and rent capital to foreign and domestic entrepreneurs
at the world rental rate of capital r∗ + δ.
We assume that entrepreneurs’ capital rental (k) is limited by a collateral constraint k ≤ λa,
where a is individual ﬁnancial wealth and λ measures the degree of credit frictions, with λ = +∞
corresponding to perfect credit markets, and λ = 1 to ﬁnancial autarky where all capital has to be
self-ﬁnanced by entrepreneurs. The same λ applies to everyone in a given economy.
Our speciﬁcation captures the common prediction from models of limited contract enforcement:
The amount of credit is limited by individuals’ wealth. At the same time, its parsimoniousness
enables us to analyze quantitative eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions on aggregate transitional dynamics
without losing tractability. This speciﬁcation has been widely used in the literature on ﬁnancial
frictions and entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989), and also in the literature on credit
frictions and business cycles (Bernanke et al., 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997).
Our collateral constraint can be derived from the following limited enforcement problem. Con-
sider an individual with ﬁnancial wealth a (deposited in the ﬁnancial intermediary) at the beginning
of a period. Assume that she rents k units of capital. Then she may choose to abscond with a
fraction (1/λ) of the rented capital. The only punishment is that she will lose her ﬁnancial wealth a
deposited in the intermediary. In particular, she will not be excluded from any economic activities
in the future. In fact, she is allowed to instantaneously deposit the stolen capital k/λ and continue
on as a worker or an entrepreneur. Note that λ in this context measures the degree of capital
rental contract enforcement, with λ = +∞ corresponding to perfect enforcement and λ = 1 to no
enforcement. In the equilibrium, the ﬁnancial intermediary will rent capital only to the extent that
no individual will renege on the rental contract, which implies a collateral constraint k/λ ≤ a or
k ≤ λa.
It should be noted that we focus on within-period borrowing, or capital rental, for production
purposes. We do not allow borrowing for intertemporal consumption smoothing in our model, which
translates into a ≥ 0. This constraint will only bind for individuals who choose to be workers, and
has no direct bearing on the behavior of entrepreneurs, who will need to hold assets to overcome
the collateral constraint.









s.t. cs + as+1 ≤ max{ws,π(as;es,ws,rs)} + (1 + rs)as, ∀s ≥ t
where et, at, and the sequence of wages and interest rates {ws,rs}∞
s=t are given, and π(a;e,w,r) is
the proﬁt from operating an individual technology. This indirect proﬁt function is deﬁned as:
π(a;e,w,r) = max
l,k≤λa
{f (e,k,l) − wl − (δ + r)k}.
The input demand functions are denoted by l(a;e,w,r) and k(a;e,w,r), and the collateral con-
straint (k ≤ λa) is taken into account.
The max operator in the budget constraint stands for the occupation choice. A type-e individual
with current wealth a will choose to be an entrepreneur if proﬁts as an entrepreneur, π(a;e,w,r),
exceed labor income as a wage earner, w. This occupational choice can be represented by a simple
policy function. Type-e individuals decide to be entrepreneurs if their current wealth a is higher
than the threshold wealth a(e), where a(e) solves:
π (a(e);e,w,r) = w.
For some e, there may not exist such an a. In particular, if e is too low, then π(a;e,w,r) < w for
all a. In this case, this type of individuals will never become entrepreneurs. Intuitively, individuals
of a given ability choose to become entrepreneurs only if they are wealthy enough to overcome the
collateral constraint and run their businesses at a proﬁtable scale. Similarly, individuals of a given
wealth level choose to become entrepreneurs only if their ability is high enough.
Competitive Equilibrium (Closed Economy) Given G0 (e,a), a competitive equilibrium in
a closed economy consists of sequences of joint distribution of ability and wealth {Gt (e,a)}
∞
t=1,
allocations {cs (et,at),as+1 (et,at),ls (et,at),ks (et,at)}
∞




t=0, et, and at, {cs (et,at),as+1 (et,at),ls (et,at),ks (et,at)}
∞
s=t solves the
agent’s problem in (1) for all t ≥ 0;







l(a;e,wt,rt)Gt (da|e) − Gt (a(e,wt,rt)|e)
#











= 0; (Capital Market)
103. The joint distribution of ability and wealth {Gt (e,a)}
∞
t=1 evolves according to the equilibrium
mapping:














A competitive equilibrium for a small open economy is deﬁned in a similar fashion, given a
world interest rate r∗. In this case, the domestic capital rental market and goods market do not














The central objective of this paper is to construct a quantitative model of TFP dynamics and capital
ﬂows during the process of development—the transition of economies from a steady state with low
per-capita income to a steady state with high per-capita income. Following a recent literature
emphasizing the role of idiosyncratic distortions (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Guner et al.,
2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2007), we interpret development dynamics as arising from reforms that
remove idiosyncratic (non-ﬁnancial) distortions, while domestic ﬁnancial market frictions remain.
In order to quantify our theory, we need ﬁrst to choose a set of structural parameters (preferences,
technologies, distribution of entrepreneurial ability) that are common across economies. Then we
choose a set of structural parameters that are diﬀerent across economies—parameters governing
idiosyncratic distortions and ﬁnancial frictions. Once all these parameters are chosen, we can use
our model to construct the initial condition for the transitions, G0 (e,a). This initial condition is a
stationary equilibrium of an economy that (i) has idiosyncratic distortions, (ii) is closed to goods
and capital ﬂows, and (iii) has a poorly-functioning domestic ﬁnancial institutions.
One may object to our assumption that diﬀerent countries are endowed with the same underlying
talent distribution. In fact, it would be straightforward to incorporate cross-country diﬀerences in
the average productivity of potential entrepreneurs and workers by considering human capital and
exogenous TFP diﬀerences. As the primary mechanism of our model concerns the allocation of
resources among heterogeneous producers, however, the main results of our analysis are robust
to such relaxation of our heroic assumption. In addition, our model provides a theory of cross-
country diﬀerences in the dispersion of productivity among active entrepreneurs, driven by ﬁnancial
frictions and non-ﬁnancial distortions. It is less obvious how one would model exogenous cross-
country diﬀerences in the higher moments of the entrepreneurial talent distribution.
3.1 Calibration
We ﬁrst calibrate the common parameters so that the stationary equilibrium of the distortion-free
benchmark economy with perfect credit markets matches the US data on standard macroeconomic
11aggregates, establishment-size distribution and dynamics, and income concentration. We then use
data on idiosyncratic distortions to construct the initial steady state for our reform exercises.
3.1.1 Parameters Common across Economies
We ﬁrst describe the parametrization of the model, and then discuss the calibration of the pa-
rameters that are common across economies. For the sake of clarity, we choose a parsimonious
parametrization that follows as much as possible the standard practices in the literature.





We assume that an entrepreneur with talent e who hires k units of capital and l units of labor
produces according to the following production function:




where 1 − ν is known as the span-of-control parameter. Accordingly, 1 − ν represents the share of
output going to the variable factors. Out of this, fraction α goes to capital, and 1−α goes to labor.
The entrepreneurial ability e is assumed to be a truncated and discretized version of a Pareto
distribution whose probability density is ηe−(η+1) for e ≥ 1. Each period, an individual may retain
her previous entrepreneurial ability with probability ψ. With probability 1 − ψ, she draws a new
ability realization from the Pareto distribution given above. Obviously, ψ controls the persistence
of ability, while η determines the dispersion of ability in the population.
We now need to specify seven parameter values: two technological parameters α, ν, and the
depreciation rate δ; two parameters describing the process for ability ψ and η; the reciprocal of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ and the subjective discount factor β.7
We let σ = 1.5 following the standard practice. The one-year depreciation rate is set at δ = 0.06.
We choose α = 0.3 to match the aggregate share of capital. We are thus left with four parameters
(ν, η, ψ, and β). We calibrate them using four relevant moments in the US data: the employment
share of the top decile of establishments; the share of income generated by the top twentieth; the
exit rate of establishments; and the real interest rate. To be more speciﬁc, we calibrate the perfect-
credit benchmark of our model to match these moments from the US, a relatively undistorted
economy.8
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 shows the value of these moments in the US data. The largest—
measured by employment—decile of establishments in the US account for 63 per cent of total
7As is common in heterogeneous-agent models with incomplete markets, the discount rate must be jointly cali-
brated with the parameters governing the stochastic income process.
8In our model, individuals face uninsured shocks to their entrepreneurial ability. We solve the perfect-credit
benchmark in two steps. First, given an aggregate supply of capital, we solve for optimal production decisions,
occupation choices, and prices. We then use the wage and entrepreneurial proﬁts coming from the production side
of the economy to solve for the saving decisions of individuals facing idiosyncratic income shocks. By aggregating
over individuals, we obtain the aggregate supply of capital. A stationary equilibrium with perfect credit markets is
a (nested) ﬁxed point of these two problems.
12US Data Model Parameter
Top 10% Employment 0.63 0.63
η = 4.6, ν = 0.19
Top 5% Income 0.30 0.31
Establishment Exit Rate 0.10 0.10 ψ = 0.89
Real Interest Rate 0.04 0.04 β = 0.92
Table 1: Calibration
employment (as of 2000). We target the income share of the top twentieth of the population (0.3,
as of 1998), and an annual job destruction rate of ten per cent (Davis et al., 1996). Finally, as the
target interest rate, we pick four per cent per year.
The second column of Table 1 shows the moments simulated from the calibrated model. Even
though in the model economy all four moments are jointly determined by the four parameters, each
moment is primarily aﬀected by one particular parameter. We brieﬂy discuss the identiﬁcation
and interpretation of some of the parameter values. Given the span-of-control parameter 1 − ν,
the tail parameter of the ability distribution η can be inferred from the tail of the distribution of
employment. We can then infer ν from the share of income of the top ﬁve per cent of the population.
Top earners are mostly entrepreneurs (both in the data and in our model), and ν controls the share
of output going to the entrepreneurial input. These two parameters are calibrated at ν = 0.19 and
η = 4.6. The parameter ψ = 0.89 leads to an annual exit rate of ten per cent in the model. Finally,
the model requires a discount factor β = 0.92 to match the interest rate of four percent.
3.1.2 Output Distortions and Financial Frictions
We model the initial condition for our transition exercises as the joint ability-wealth distribution in
a closed-economy stationary equilibrium under ﬁnancial frictions and non-ﬁnancial distortions. For
the purpose of measurement exercises, these frictions can be thought of as idiosyncratic distortions,
or individual-speciﬁc taxes/subsidies (τyi,τki), that distort the static proﬁt-maximization problem







− wli − (1 + τki)(δ + r)ki.
Note that τki is a reduced-form representation of the ﬁnancial frictions in our model—the collateral
constraint λ in our model is not individual-speciﬁc.9 This speciﬁcation is identical to the framework
that Hsieh and Klenow (2007) use to quantify idiosyncratic distortions in Chinese and Indian
manufacturing sectors. In particular, they deﬁne and measure a geometric average of output and
capital distortions for each production unit: τi ≡ (1 + τki)(1−ν)α/(1 − τyi).10 More dispersion of τi
9In particular, 1+τki = α(1−ν)(1−τyi)eik(a,(1−τyi)ei)
α(1−ν)−1l(a,(1−τyi)ei)
(1−α)(1−ν), where k(a,(1−τyi)ei) =
min{λa,k
u((1 − τyi)ei)}, and k
u(·) denotes the unconstrained proﬁt-maximizing level of capital input as a function
of an individual’s distorted ability. Again, individual ﬁnancial wealth is denoted by a.
10Hsieh and Klenow assume monopolistically-competitive ﬁrms that use constant returns to scale technologies and
face iso-elastic demands. It can be shown that their measured distortions are isomorphic to those in our framework.
13translates into lower aggregate TFP and output. They ﬁnd that idiosyncratic distortions (τi) in
Chinese and Indian manufacturing sectors are rampant, with a log-diﬀerence between the ninetieth
and the tenth percentiles of 1.73–1.87 (compared with 1.04 in the US). In Table 2 we reproduce
these moments for China, India and the US.
In the perfect-credit benchmark of our model without non-ﬁnancial distortions (i.e., τyi ≡ 0),
which is calibrated to the US data, measured logτi is zero for all production units indexed by i.
There are two reasons for omitting non-ﬁnancial distortions (τyi) in our perfect-credit benchmark
and instead targeting the diﬀerence in the dispersion of distortions between the US and China/India.
First, parts of the measured distortions may be measurement errors that aﬀect the data from China,
India and the US in a similar way. Second, the benchmark calibration (Section 3.1.1) is cleaner
without τyi’s.
90–10 TFP Wealth Share of Top 5% e
US 1.04        
China/India 1.73–1.87        
λ = 1.5,τyi ≡ 0 0.82 0.81 0.47
λ = 1.5,τyi  = 0 0.86 0.66 0.37
Table 2: Measured Distortions. The column ‘90–10’ reports the log-diﬀerence between the ninetieth and the
tenth percentile production units in terms of τi. The upper panel data on the US and China/India are from
Hsieh and Klenow (2007). The lower panel reports corresponding moments from our model. The ﬁrst row in
the lower panel is the case with ﬁnancial frictions only. The last row is the case with both ﬁnancial frictions
and non-ﬁnancial distortions. TFP is normalized by its level in the perfect-credit benchmark (λ = +∞) with
no idiosyncratic distortions (τyi ≡ 0 for all production units). The last column reports the share of wealth
held by the top twentieth of the true (undistorted) ability distribution.
We impose a τyi process and ﬁnancial frictions (λ = 1.5, which results in an external ﬁnance
to GDP ratio of a typical less developed economy, 0.6–0.8) onto our benchmark calibration (Table
1), and use our model to compute the stationary equilibrium.11 We discipline our choice of τyi so
that, among the active entrepreneurs in the stationary equilibrium, the log-diﬀerence between the
ninetieth and the tenth percentiles (in terms of τi) is around 0.8 (the diﬀerence between China/India
and the US).12 Last but not least, we also impose that the subsidies and taxes through τyi cancel
out across all active establishments, so that the net tax revenue/subsidy is zero. Recall that τki is
a mere accounting device and hence does not factor into the tax revenue/subsidy calculation.
One caveat is that the span of control parameter, 1 − ν, corresponding to Hsieh and Klenow’s calibration of the
elasticity of substitution is on the low side (close to 0.5). In our economy, idiosyncratic distortions will have a
substantially smaller eﬀect on TFP, because of our more conventional choice of 1 − ν = 0.81 (Atkeson and Kehoe,
2005).
11We specify a process for distorted entrepreneurial abilities ˜ e = (1 − τy)e. The process for distorted abilities ˜ e
is described by a probability distribution ϕ(˜ e|e), summarizing the probability with which an individual with ability
e ∈ E is assigned a distorted ability ˜ e ∈ ˜ E. The support of the distorted abilities is a transformation of that of the
true abilities, ˜ E = T (E). We assume that the distorted ability and the true ability are equally persistent (ψ), and
have the same support.
12It turns out that the eﬀects on TFP of the underlying distribution of distortions are not necessarily well captured
by a limited set of moments, such as the 90–10 ratio. We choose to complement the information provided by the
moments reported in Hsieh and Klenow (2007) with a conservative upper bound for the eﬀect on TFP.
14The second-to-last row of Table 2 corresponds to an economy with ﬁnancial frictions but no τyi.
The log-diﬀerence between the ninetieth and the tenth percentiles of τi is 0.82. In this economy,
TFP is only aﬀected by ﬁnancial frictions, and it is 19 per cent below that of the benchmark
economy. The bottom row (λ = 1.5,τyi  = 0) of Table 2 is the stationary equilibrium that closely
matches our targets. In particular, the TFP of the economy subject to both ﬁnancial frictions and
non-ﬁnancial distortions is 34 per cent lower than in the benchmark economy. Both output and
capital distortions have a similar role in lowering TFP: Financial frictions alone reduce the TFP
by 19 per cent, and the output distortions further reduce TFP by additional 15 per cent (again
relative to the perfect-credit benchmark level).
In computing the stationary equilibrium, we also obtain the corresponding joint distribution of
ability and wealth. The wealth share of the top twentieth of individuals in terms of true ability (e) is
0.37 in the economy with ﬁnancial frictions and non-ﬁnancial distortions. This is lower than in the
economy with ﬁnancial frictions only (0.47). With ﬁnancial frictions, individual wealth determines
via the collateral constraint how much capital an entrepreneur can use for production. The lower
concentration of wealth (and hence resources) in the hands of the most productive entrepreneurs
is a measure of resource misallocation attributable to non-ﬁnancial distortions (τyi).
The joint distribution of wealth and ability summarized in the bottom row of Table 2 is the initial
condition for our transition exercises in Section 3.3. In summary, the pre-reform initial condition
is the stationary equilibrium of an economy that (i) has idiosyncratic distortions (τyi  = 0), (ii)
is closed to goods and capital ﬂows, and (iii) has poorly-functioning domestic ﬁnancial markets
(λ = 1.5).
3.2 Steady State Results: Financial Frictions and the Returns to Saving
We ﬁrst report the long-run eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions in our model.13 In Figure 3, we consider
how the output and interest rate of the stationary equilibria respond to changes in the collateral
constraint parameter λ. Recall that a lower λ means more ﬁnancial frictions, with λ = 1 corre-
sponding to zero external ﬁnancing and λ = +∞ to perfect credit markets. For this analysis, the
economy is closed, and there is no output distortion (τyi ≡ 0). There is a monotonic relationship
between λ and the equilibrium ratio of external ﬁnance to GDP: The higher λ, the higher the ex-
ternal ﬁnance to GDP ratio. We plot equilibrium output and interest rate against external ﬁnance
to GDP ratio, instead of λ itself. In the ﬁgure, we are considering the range of external ﬁnance
to GDP that is relevant to developing countries (0.1 to 1.58). Our perfect-credit benchmark, for
example, has an external ﬁnance to GDP ratio exceeding 2.0, which corresponds to the US level.
The left panel shows the eﬀect of the collateral constraint on aggregate output, which is mea-
sured relative to its value in the case with λ = 7.5 (external ﬁnance to GDP ratio of 1.58). Note
that ﬁnancial frictions have a sizable eﬀect on output: As we reduce ﬁnancial intermediation, out-
put can drop by 27 per cent. Nevertheless, this exercise shows that ﬁnancial frictions alone are not
enough to account for the output gap between developed and less developed economies.
13See Buera and Shin (2008) and Buera et al. (2009) for more on the long-run eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions.
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Fig. 3: The Eﬀect of Financial Frictions on Closed-Economy Stationary Equilibria. We generate stationary
equilibria corresponding to diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnancial frictions (λ). These economies are closed, and there
are no idiosyncratic non-ﬁnancial distortions (τyi ≡ 0). The external ﬁnance to GDP ratio (horizontal axis)
has a monotonic (positive) relationship with λ. Here λ ranges from 1.1 (external ﬁnance to GDP of 0.1) to
7.5 (external ﬁnance to GDP of 1.58). Output (left panel) is normalized by its level with λ = 7.5.
More important, economies with worse credit markets have lower equilibrium interest rates.
The lower interest rate in the general equilibrium follows from entrepreneurs’ restricted demand
for capital because of tighter collateral constraints, and also from their higher saving rates because
of the need for self-ﬁnancing (a bigger supply of capital, all else equal). This prediction of our
model is consistent with empirical ﬁndings. Figure 4 plots the time-averaged real returns to saving
of a country against its income level. The regression line has a positive slope, consistent with our
model prediction that returns to saving in less developed countries with poorly-functioning ﬁnancial
markets are lower than those in developed countries.14 This is not surprising given the prevalence
of “ﬁnancial repression” in less developed countries.
From this, we can foresee what will happen if capital is allowed to ﬂow across countries. When
a less developed country opens up to international capital markets, the domestic interest rate will
rise and be equalized with the world interest rate, which is pinned down by large, rich countries
with well-functioning ﬁnancial markets. At this new, higher interest rate, there is excess supply
of domestic capital in the rental market, and this surplus capital will be rented out to overseas
production units. This is the main mechanism explored in the literature to explain why capital may
ﬂow from less developed to more developed economies. The examples include Gertler and Rogoﬀ
(1990), Boyd and Smith (1997), Matsuyama (2005), and Mendoza et al. (2009). Our contribution
is to go beyond this result and endogenize the joint transitional dynamics of aggregate productivity
and capital ﬂows. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to do so.
14The average return is not adjusted for risk. Given the volatility of the real returns to saving in less developed
economies, the regression line will tilt steeper, if we look at risk-adjusted returns. Independently of our work,
Ohanian and Wright (private communication) obtained similar results. Note that, in our model, if we were to allow
for borrowing across periods (i.e. a < 0) subject to the natural borrowing limit, the equilibrium interest rate will
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Fig. 4: Returns to Saving across Countries. The data are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database. We subtract ex-post inﬂation rates from nominal deposit rates. When deposit rates are not
available, we use returns on government-issued securities. The average over the 1980–95 period is shown
for both the real returns to saving and the per-capita GDP. Ex-Soviet countries, other than Russia, are
excluded.
3.3 Post-Reform Transition Dynamics
In this section, we study the co-movement of TFP and capital ﬂows following large-scale economic
reforms and liberalizations. We consider two main exercises. Both will start with a closed economy
that is laden with idiosyncratic distortions, in addition to ﬁnancial frictions, and hence with resource
misallocation. The domestic ﬁnancial market is underdeveloped, with λ = 1.5 to be consistent with
the data on external ﬁnance in a typical less-developed country (Beck et al., 2000). The construction
of this initial condition has been discussed in detail in Section 3.1.2.
Building Intuition: One Reform at a Time Before we begin, we consider two simple exercises
to illustrate the eﬀects of diﬀerent reforms. In our main exercises below, we open the economy to
goods and capital ﬂows, precisely when we implement a reform to eliminate idiosyncratic distortions.
In the simple exercises here, starting from the same initial condition, we consider ﬁrst opening up
the economy while leaving idiosyncratic distortions intact. We then look at the alternative exercise
of eliminating idiosyncratic distortions while leaving the economy closed to goods and capital ﬂows.
In the left panel of Figure 5, we open up the economy to goods and capital ﬂows in year zero,
without doing anything about the idiosyncratic distortions. The domestic ﬁnancial market is left
as it was. Capital ﬂows out of the economy, and the net foreign asset position (NFA) jumps up and
increases smoothly over time. This result should have been expected based on our discussion in
Section 3.2 (right panel, Figure 3). However, without any reform on idiosyncratic distortions, the
aggregate productivity (TFP) of the economy barely moves. It actually goes up by six per cent, as
the new, higher rental rate of capital shuts down marginal producers, who tend to be incompetent
entrepreneurs propped up by subsidies. In addition, the higher TFP also reﬂects the fact that
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Fig. 5: One Reform at a Time. In the left panel, the economy opens up to the international capital market
in year 0, but no reform is implemented to address either idiosyncratic distortions or domestic ﬁnancial
frictions. The net foreign asset (NFA) is relative to the pre-reform aggregate capital stock K0−. TFP is
relative to its pre-reform level. In the right panel, a reform is implemented to remove all idiosyncratic
distortions, but the economy remains closed and the domestic ﬁnancial frictions remain intact. The unit of
the horizontal axis is years.
productive entrepreneurs can enter and grow faster than before, as they now earn higher returns
to their saving.15
In the right panel of Figure 5, we consider the opposite: implementing a reform to remove all
idiosyncratic distortions, while leaving the economy closed.16 Again, the domestic ﬁnancial market
is left as it was. Following the reform, TFP jumps up and gradually increases over time: Over the
ﬁrst ten years following the reform, TFP increases by about 2.5 per cent per year. This reﬂects
more eﬃcient reallocation of resources over time, as productive entrepreneurs save up and enter,
while incompetent ones who lose their subsidy exit. However, obviously by assumption, there is no
ﬂow of capital in and out of the economy, and the net foreign asset position stays at zero.
The above examples suggest that we should consider an exercise where we eliminate distortions
and open up the economy, as our goal is to study the joint dynamics of TFP and capital ﬂows.
Exercise 1: Distortion Removal and Opening Up Here we combine the two reforms con-
sidered above. The economic liberalization occurs in year zero. It is unexpected. Once it happens,
everyone understands that it is a once-and-for-all change. In this exercise, the liberalization con-
sists of two components. One is the opening up of the economy’s capital accounts, and the other
is the removal of the idiosyncratic distortions. However, we assume that domestic ﬁnancial fric-
tions remain intact. We are thinking of ﬁnancial frictions as arising from enforcement problem,
which is a component of broader institutions and is hence more sluggish. The reform experiences
of the countries we study in Section 1 are consistent with this sequencing of reforms. Measured in
both de jure and de facto sense, domestic ﬁnancial market reforms lagged behind the removal of
15However, this last eﬀect is largely unimportant, as it is partly negated by easier self-ﬁnancing for subsidized
incompetent entrepreneurs.
16See Buera and Shin (2008) for a detailed analysis of this case. Also, see the appendix of that paper for descriptions
of the computational algorithm.
18size-dependent or industry-speciﬁc taxes and subsidies, as well as capital account liberalizations.17
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Fig. 6: Transition Dynamics without Domestic Financial Market Reform. In year 0, a reform is implemented
to remove all idiosyncratic distortions in the economy. At the same time, the economy opens up to the world
capital market. Domestic ﬁnancial frictions remain intact. In the left panel, net foreign asset positions are
measured relative to the pre-reform aggregate capital stock (K0−). An increase in net foreign asset position
implies capital outﬂows. In the center panel, TFP (solid line) and the average ability of active entrepreneurs
(dashed line) are shown. Both quantities are relative to their respective pre-reform level. The right panel
plots the GDP series, also relative to its pre-reform level. The unit of the horizontal axis is years.
The result of this liberalization episode is shown in Figure 6. From year 0, as the reform
is implemented, resources now get reallocated more eﬃciently. The increasing TFP reﬂects this
reallocation (solid line, center panel). More eﬃcient reallocation of resources occurs along two
margins. First, capital and labor are reallocated among existing entrepreneurs (intensive margin).
In addition, more productive entrepreneurs will enter, while previously-subsidized incompetent
entrepreneurs will exit (extensive margin). The dashed line in the middle panel shows the average
ability/talent of active entrepreneurs. Note that the eﬃcient reallocation along these two margins
occur gradually over time (the unit of the horizontal axis is years), as the reallocation is slowed
down by domestic ﬁnancial frictions: It takes time for a talented-but-poor entrepreneur to self-
ﬁnance the capital needed for operating at a proﬁt-maximizing scale. Both TFP and the average
entrepreneurial talent are measured relative to their respective pre-reform levels.
The GDP per capita (right panel) also increases following the reform, largely mirroring the
increase in TFP early on (ﬁrst eight years) and the accumulation of capital later (10 to 20 years
after the reform). Per-capita GDP is also measured relative to its pre-reform level.
Notice that capital account liberalization leads to a bigger increase in TFP in the long run, over
and beyond the pure eﬀect from the elimination of idiosyncratic distortions (right panel, Figure
5): 38 per cent vs. 26 per cent. With a higher interest rate (owing to the international ﬁnancial
integration) individuals can accumulate assets more quickly for self-ﬁnancing, and hence collateral
constraints inﬂict less misallocation of productive capital overall.18
17Beim and Calomiris (2001) also document evidence of capital account liberalizations preceding domestic ﬁnancial
market reforms in numerous developing economies.
18Note the importance of the joint reforms. For instance, by itself, the liberalization of capital ﬂows leading to a
higher interest rate will only generate small TFP gains—six per cent (left panel, Figure 5).
19In the left panel, the net foreign asset position jumps up and then goes further up gradually. The
NFA is measured relative to the pre-reform aggregate capital stock (K0−). The increase in the NFA
in the beginning is driven by the fall in demand in the domestic capital rental market. Opening up
capital accounts implies that the domestic rental rate of capital is equalized to the world level, which
is higher. As the rental rate increases, less capital is demanded. At the same time, some of the
entrepreneurs who lose their subsidy will begin to exit, further reducing the demand in the domestic
capital rental market. However, they are not immediately replaced by truly productive individuals
who were previously taxed highly and kept out of entrepreneurial activities. These individuals are
not rich enough to overcome the collateral constraints and start production immediately: They
have to work as workers and save up enough collateral ﬁrst. All these factors explain a fall in
domestic capital demand, and the surplus capital ﬂows out of the country, increasing the NFA. As
the talented entrepreneurs enter and increase their scales of operation over time, domestic demand
for capital goes up. This increased demand is partly matched by accumulation of assets (supply
of capital) by these entrepreneurs for self-ﬁnancing purposes—a consequence of domestic ﬁnancial
frictions that still remain. In addition, the higher interest rate induces all individuals to save more,
further driving up the net foreign asset position over time. In summary, capital keeps ﬂowing out
of the country, while its TFP increases, consistent with the data shown in Figure 2. This is our
resolution of the allocation puzzle.
Exercise 2: Distortion Removal, Opening Up, and Domestic Financial Sector Reform
The diﬀerence here is that the large-scale reform in year 0 has one additional component. On top
of the capital account liberalization and the removal of idiosyncratic distortions, we will also reform
the domestic ﬁnancial market, increasing its λ from 1.5 to 7.5. The choice of λ = 7.5 corresponds
to the equilibrium external ﬁnance to GDP ratio of 1.58 (Figure 3), which is a level few, if any,
developing countries reached before 2000. In this sense, λ = 7.5 represents a very well-functioning
ﬁnancial market by the developing country standard.
The result is shown in Figure 7. The reforms lead to more eﬃcient reallocation of resources, as
is reﬂected on the TFP series. The TFP increases faster and rises higher than in Exercise 1. So do
the average entrepreneurial ability and output. In particular, GDP goes up by more than 75 per
cent within four years, while in Exercise 1 the corresponding number is 13 per cent. Both Exercises
1 and 2 have the same initial condition, and Figures 6 and 7 have the same scale, facilitating visual
comparison. Here the TFP (and GDP as well) increases for two reasons: the removal of idiosyncratic
distortions, and the improved domestic ﬁnancial markets. The latter expedites the reallocation of
capital among heterogeneous producers, and facilitates the entry into entrepreneurship of talented
individuals. As a result, the TFP grows faster and converges to a higher level than in Exercise 1.
So does the GDP.
The net foreign asset position looks starkly diﬀerent from Figure 6. Initially, opening up capital
accounts increases the capital rental rate, and previously-subsidized entrepreneurs exit, reducing
the demand in the domestic capital rental market. However, as the collateral constraints are now a
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Fig. 7: Transition Dynamics with Domestic Financial Market Reform. In year 0, a reform is implemented
to remove all idiosyncratic distortions in the economy. At the same time, the economy opens up to the world
capital market. Unlike in Exercise 1, domestic ﬁnancial frictions are partially eliminated (λ from 1.5 to 7.5).
In the left panel, net foreign asset positions are measured relative to the pre-reform aggregate capital stock
(K0−). In the center panel, TFP (solid line) and the average ability of active entrepreneurs (dashed line)
are shown. Both quantities are relative to their respective pre-reform level. The right panel plots the GDP
series, also relative to its pre-reform level. The unit of the horizontal axis is years.
lot less stringent following the domestic ﬁnancial market reform, truly-productive individuals can
enter entrepreneurship and start production immediately, even if they are poor. This entry more
than oﬀsets the fall in the demand for capital by incumbent entrepreneurs and those who exit, and
capital ﬂows in from overseas to meet this excess demand. The NFA jumps downward initially.
Afterwards, given the rising productivity and the swift increases in domestic demand for capital
(because of less strict collateral constraints), capital continues to ﬂow in for the next three years.
Note that the entrepreneurs now have weaker self-ﬁnancing motives given their ability to raise more
external ﬁnancing.
It is informative to compare Exercise 2 with one using the standard neoclassical growth model.
In our setup, an economy with perfect domestic credit markets is isomorphic to the neoclassical
growth model. If the productivity of the aggregate production function is raised in a neoclassical
model, capital will ﬂow into this small open economy and equalize the return to capital with
the world level instantaneously. Although our domestic ﬁnancial market reform does not take
our economy all the way to the perfect-credit benchmark, we obtain results that are qualitatively
similar.
Empirically, the experiences of Estonia and Thailand can be interpreted as a version of this
exercise. Estonia underwent an economy-wide reform in 1992, addressing industrial policies, capital
account liberalization, and domestic banking sector reforms (Roland, 2000). In particular, large
Swedish banks set up subsidiaries in Estonia and carried out the majority of domestic ﬁnancial
intermediation. As can be seen in Figure 8, Estonia’s experience is close to the neoclassical model.
To some degree, the Thai reform of 1986 also addressed the domestic ﬁnancial markets (Townsend,
2006). In particular, the fraction of bank loans forcefully channeled to the government dropped
sharply. The ensuing TFP and NFA series are consistent with our results in Figure 7, although the










































Fig. 8: TFP and Net Foreign Asset Position. Year 0 on the horizontal axis is the year of reform imple-
mentation, which is shown in parentheses next to the country name. Net foreign asset position as a fraction
of PPP GDP is measured on the left scale, and aggregate TFP can be read oﬀ the right scale. TFP is
normalized by its value in year 0. The unit of the horizontal axis is years.
Castro and Clementi (2009) also document the large-scale reform in Portugal as it joined the
European Union in 1986. In addition to reducing idiosyncratic taxes and subsidies, Portugal
rewrote its century-old commercial code to enhance investor protection. Castro and Clementi
show that capital ﬂowed into Portugal, in response to the improved investor protection. The time-
series evidence in Figure 8 is less clear-cut: TFP increased the most during the ﬁve-year period
immediately following the reform, while capital inﬂow begins in earnest seven years after the reform.
Such observed post-reform dynamics can be reconciled with our model predictions if the domestic
ﬁnancial market reform is implemented piecemeal over several years.
3.4 Welfare Consequence of Capital Account Liberalization
While economists readily agree on the merits of removing idiosyncratic distortions and reforming
domestic ﬁnancial markets, there seems to be less certainty regarding the beneﬁts of opening up
to international capital ﬂows. Our framework can be used to assess the welfare gains from capital
account liberalization. In most studies in the literature, capital account liberalization improves
welfare, but the magnitude is rather small.19
Here we focus on the interaction of capital account liberalization with other reforms. This is
a very relevant question, as capital account liberalizations of developing countries were typically
accompanied by other reforms that removed distortions in these economies. We here analyze the
welfare gains from capital account liberalization by comparing the economic outcomes of removing
idiosyncratic distortions while opening up (Exercise 1) with those of removing idiosyncratic distor-
tions while remaining closed to capital ﬂows. The latter has already been analyzed in Section 3.3,
19See Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) and the references therein. Unlike most work in the literature that assumes
a small economy populated by a representative agent, our model has heterogeneous individuals within an economy
and can address diﬀerential eﬀects of capital ﬂows on these individuals. Aoki et al. (2007, 2009) and Mendoza et al.
(2009) also provide welfare analyses with heterogeneous-agent models.
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Fig. 9: Welfare Gains from Capital Account Liberalization. The horizontal axis is the percentile in the pre-
reform (unconditional) wealth distribution. Each curve corresponds to diﬀerent ability level. The vertical
axis is welfare gains in units of relative increase in permanent consumption. A positive number implies a
particular individual of a given ability and wealth at the time of the reform is better oﬀ with concurrent
capital account liberalization. A negative number, on the other hand, indicates that the individual is better
oﬀ when the removal of idiosyncratic distortions is done in a closed-economy environment.
On the horizontal axis of Figure 9, individuals are sorted according to their wealth prior to the
reform. Each curve corresponds to individuals with diﬀerent ability. For example, the dashed line
is for those individuals who are more talented than all but two per cent of the population. The
vertical axis measures the welfare diﬀerence in units of permanent consumption. A positive number
means that this particular type of individual—where type is deﬁned as one’s wealth level and ability
at the time of the reform—prefers the removal of idiosyncratic distortions to be accompanied by
opening up of capital accounts. Similarly, a negative number means that the individual prefers the
removal of idiosyncratic distortions to be done in a closed-economy environment.
We ﬁnd that not all individuals beneﬁt from concurrent capital account liberalization. Obvi-
ously, the wealthy directly beneﬁt from capital account liberalization, which instantaneously give
them a higher return—the world interest rate—on their ﬁnancial assets. High-ability individuals,
who will choose to be entrepreneurs and likely be wealthy, are better oﬀ when the economy also
opens up. Even the talented-but-poor individuals, because they get rich over time, beneﬁt from the
higher interest rate—the left tail of the dashed line lies above zero. On the other hand, low-ability
individuals, who will choose to be workers, are better oﬀ when the economy remains closed, unless
they start out very wealthy (solid line). With capital account liberalization, capital ﬂows out of
the country following the reform. Holding other things equal, this implies less capital per worker
for domestic production, and the wage is lower than in the closed-economy transition, albeit tem-
porarily. Wage eventually rises to a higher level with capital account liberalization, but the lower
23wage along the transition prevails on the overall welfare of low-ability individuals.
Given that the very wealthy and entrepreneurs are but a small fraction of the population, the
vast majority would prefer the elimination of idiosyncratic distortions to be carried out with capital
account controls in place.
4 Concluding Remarks
We show in our quantitative framework that, following a reform that eliminates idiosyncratic dis-
tortions and liberalizes capital ﬂows, there will be a gradual rise in TFP accompanied by capital
outﬂows. The rising TFP is the consequence of the more eﬃcient reallocation of capital and talent,
a process slowed down by frictions in domestic ﬁnancial markets. Capital outﬂows are driven by
the rise in domestic saving in response to a higher return, and by the sluggish response of domestic
investment to the higher productivity, the latter being another consequence of the frictions in do-
mestic ﬁnancial markets. From our exercises, we conclude that it is important to understand the
workings of domestic ﬁnancial markets ﬁrst if one wanted to evaluate the consequences of capital
account liberalization. Indeed, opening up capital accounts may well have adverse welfare conse-
quences for the majority of the population in economies with underdeveloped domestic ﬁnancial
markets.
Our analysis abstracts from diﬀerent types of capital ﬂows, e.g., debt contracts vs. foreign
direct investment, which could exhibit diﬀerent dynamics. For instance, in recent years, we have
observed developing countries accumulating debt claims on foreigners while receiving foreign direct
investment. We conjecture that an extension of our model that allows for the joint mobility of
capital and entrepreneurial talents will account for such gross ﬂow patterns. As in the current paper,
we would observe capital in the form of debt contracts ﬂow out of economies with underdeveloped
domestic ﬁnancial markets. At the same time, there will be wealthy foreign entrepreneurs who can
bring in their own capital or collateral into such countries to take advantage of their lower factor
prices. Such an extension will also enable us to study the ﬂow of talented-but-undercapitalized
entrepreneurs who will migrate into countries with more developed ﬁnancial markets, a phenomenon
resembling what is often referred to as “brain drain.”
24Appendix: Notes on Economic Reforms
We brieﬂy describe the six large reform episodes that took place during the 1980s and the 1990s.
We emphasize the three components of reforms we use in our model: reduction of idiosyncratic
distortions, capital account liberalization, and domestic ﬁnancial market reform.
Chile, 1985 Following the debt and banking crisis of the early 1980s, in 1985 the Chilean
government started a round of reforms (Bosworth et al., 1994). These included the privatization of
state-owned enterprises and ﬁrms taken over during the 1982 ﬁnancial collapse, and the reversal of
protective measures imposed during the crisis. This wave of reforms not only reinforced the broad
movement toward a more market-oriented allocation of resources that had started in the mid 1970s,
but also remedied some shortcomings of the earlier reforms—e.g., the earlier process of privatization
allowed the formation of business conglomerates through the sale of state-owned assets, which were
purchased with ﬁnancing provided by the state with funds obtained by abusing the implicit bank
deposit insurance. The reforms of 1985 proved to be longer-lasting. We interpreted these series
of reforms as more credible eﬀorts at removing/reducing idiosyncratic distortions in the context of
our model.
Controls on capital outﬂows that had been imposed in 1982 were removed in 1985, although
restrictions on short-term capital inﬂows remained.
At the time of the 1985 reform, the domestic ﬁnancial markets were still reeling from the
ﬁnancial crisis of 1982. While the ﬁnancial system developed signiﬁcantly in the following decade,
ﬁnancial intermediation remained relatively limited through the mid 1990s.
India, 1991 Following a balance of payment crisis, in 1991 India embarked on a broad set of
reforms (Kochhar et al., 2006). These reforms included the abolition of industrial licensing and the
narrowing of the scope of public sector monopolies to a much smaller number of industries; trade
liberalization which included elimination of import licensing and progressive reduction of non-tariﬀ
barriers; the liberalization of investment in important services, such as telecommunications; and
limited ﬁnancial sector reforms.
Deregulation of capital ﬂows began in 1991, with the liberalization of inward foreign direct and
portfolio investment. Exchange rates were uniﬁed in 1993, and current account convertibility was
achieved by 1994.
Gradual domestic ﬁnancial sector reforms started in the mid 1990s, including the removal of
controls on capital issues, and freer entry for domestic and foreign private banks. However, credit
control remained throughout the 1990s.
Israel, 1985 In 1985 a successful stabilization plan was put into place. As a consequence of
budget adjustments and subsequent reforms, the principal markets (capital, foreign exchange, and
labor) underwent important changes (Ben-Bassat, 2002). Government interventions in production
factor markets and in ﬁnances were signiﬁcantly reduced. The share of government expenditure in
25the GDP declined by 20 percentage points in the ﬁrst ten years of the reform. More important,
the composition of the budget changed from an emphasis on subsidies to “priority” industries and
regions, into broader investment in infrastructure. Earlier protectionist tendencies were slowly
reverted. In 1985 a free-trade agreement with the US was signed, and by 1990 all non-tariﬀ
barriers on imports from “third countries” were abolished and replaced with uniform tariﬀs. In
1992 a process of lowering these tariﬀs started.
Controls on capital ﬂows that had been imposed in 1970 began to be reversed in 1987, and the
liberalization was more or less completed by 1998. The remaining restrictions pertain to overseas
investment by institutional investors and forward transactions.
Distortions to domestic ﬁnancial markets remained signiﬁcant until the mid 1990s. Directed
credit, regulated interest rate, public ownership of major banks lasted until the mid 1990s.
Korea, 1982 In the second half of the 1970s, the Korean government embarked on a large-
scale program subsidizing heavy and chemical industries. This was a form of import substitution,
and the beneﬁciaries were steel, petrochemical, nonferrous metals, shipbuilding, electronics, and
machinery industries. This experiment ceased and began to be reversed in 1981 (Leipziger, 1997).
The failed industrial policy led the government to delegate the role of investment planning to the
private sector. Entry of small and medium-sized ﬁrms was deregulated from the early 1980s. The
sector/industry-speciﬁc taxes were replaced by ﬂat-rate value-added taxes in the late 1970s.
Controls on capital ﬂows were eased ﬁrst in 1979 (inward), then in 1982 (inward), and then
again in 1985 (inward and outward).
Rampant distortions of the ﬁnancial markets remained until the mid 1990s. Directed lending
and regulated interest rates—often thought of as the legacy or the “scar” from the industrial policies
of the 1970s—were phased out beginning in 1995 to join the OECD, and in 1998 to meet the IMF
conditionality in the aftermath of the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis.
Mauritius, 1981 Starting with the negotiation of a structural adjustment loan with the World
Bank in 1980, a process of reform began that progressively removed various distortions (Gulhati
and Nallari, 1990; Dabee and Greenaway, 2001). The theme of the reforms was to move away
from a focus on import substitution, which accounted for 80 per cent of manufacturing investment
during 1978–81. These reforms included the elimination of price controls, quantity restrictions on
imports, and export taxes on sugar. Also included was a gradual reduction of tariﬀs. As part of
these reforms, the government eliminated the diﬀerential tax treatment for companies under various
special regimes, e.g., export promotion zones and import substitution regimes. Especially in the
sugar industry (a major player well into the 1980s), most size-dependent policies were abandoned,
leading to consolidations and productivity gains.
Capital account liberalization began in 1981, although it was a gradual process. Exchange rates
were unpegged and managed-ﬂoated since 1983.
Domestic ﬁnancial market reforms began towards the end of the 1980s, with interest rate
26liberalization in 1988. However, pricing and allocation of funds were heavily inﬂuenced by the
central bank well into the late 1990s. The government’s share of domestic commercial bank credit
remained at 30–35 per cent until the late 1980s, and then dropped to 25 per cent by the mid 1990s.
Taiwan, 1982 Much like Korea during the mid 1970s, Taiwan’s response to the ﬁrst oil shock
in 1974 was to increase the government’s involvement in the economy. The government increased
spending on infrastructure (railways, roads, and airports) and implemented policies to replace
imported intermediate capital goods with domestically-produced materials. The beneﬁciaries of
such import-substitution policies were petrochemical, machinery, and steel industries. At the same
time, trade barriers went up, reversing the decades-long trend of trade liberalization. With their
eighth four-year plan (1982–86), the emphasis of the economic policy fell again on liberalization and
internationalization, removing many of the industrial policies of the late 1970s (Leipziger, 1997).
Foreign exchange rate and capital account liberalizations took place during the mid 1980s.
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, domestic ﬁnancial markets served as
instruments for the government’s industrial policy. Domestic ﬁnancial market liberalization started
in 1989, with controls on bank loan/deposit rates abolished. New entries into the banking sector
were not allowed until 1992–95. Financial markets were still tightly regulated even in the late 1990s,
although privatization of some ﬁnancial institutions and more liberalization began in 1994–95.
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